NIST800 171 · Control 3.3.2 · Priority: high · Component: Audit and Accountability

What this control covers

This control requires the inclusion of specific content in audit records, such as the event type, time, location, source, outcome, and associated identities of individuals or entities. It also allows for the inclusion of additional details to support the auditing function, such as event success or failure indicators and detailed descriptions of privileged commands or user identities. This control supports the Audit Record Configuration capability within the Audit and Accountability (3.3) family.

Why it matters

Privileged accounts are the prize attackers seek; just-in-time elevation, session monitoring and approval workflows shrink the window where a stolen privileged credential is useful.

How to implement

AWS

Use IAM Identity Center (formerly AWS SSO) as the single source of truth for human access; back it with your corporate IdP via SAML/SCIM. Avoid IAM users for people — they don't get MFA-by-default, rotation, or session lifetimes. For workloads, use IAM Roles (assumed by EC2/Lambda/EKS service accounts via IRSA) and never long-lived access keys. Run IAM Access Analyzer weekly to surface unused access and external-account exposure.

Azure

Centralize identity on Microsoft Entra ID (formerly Azure AD). Require Conditional Access policies: MFA for all admin roles, block legacy auth, location/device gating. Use Privileged Identity Management (PIM) to make admin roles just-in-time and time-bound. For Azure resources, prefer Managed Identities over service principals with secrets.

GCP

Use Cloud Identity (or Workspace) as the IdP and IAM for resource access. Grant roles at the lowest scope (project > folder > org) using Workload Identity Federation for CI/CD and service accounts for workloads — never download service-account keys when avoidable. Enable Policy Intelligence recommenders to right-size privileges and detect dormant identities.

Google Workspace

Enforce 2-Step Verification (preferably hardware keys for admins) for the entire org, set session length to ≤ 12 hours, and disable less-secure-app access. Use Context-Aware Access levels to restrict admin sign-in by IP/device posture. Provision and de-provision users via SCIM from your HRIS so leavers lose access on day one.

GitHub

Require SSO + SCIM from your IdP on the organisation; enforce 2FA org-wide and use fine-grained PATs (or, better, GitHub Apps) instead of classic tokens. Restrict outside collaborators, require signed commits on protected branches, and use OIDC from Actions to short-lived AWS/GCP/Azure credentials rather than stored secrets.

Zoho Mail

Make two-factor authentication mandatory for all users (TOTP, OneAuth, or YubiKey) in Admin Console → Security. Configure SAML SSO against your IdP and disable password-based logins for admins. Use role-based privileges (Admin / Spam Moderator / Mail Account Admin) and review the Login history report monthly for anomalies.

Evidence to collect

  • identity_scan — See the iCompaas Evidence library for the canonical source for this evidence type.

Identity analytics (Okta, SailPoint, Access Analyzer) demonstrates least-privilege. Focus: Audit Record Content.

Quick checklist

  • Access — Management / Configuration
  • Event — Management / Configuration
  • Audit Record — Management / Configuration
  • Time — Management / Configuration
  • Configuration — Management / Configuration

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